On October 13, 2023, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made a noteworthy broadcast on state television that could have significant ramifications for the politics of the Horn of Africa. Framed as a documentary, the broadcast put forth a provocative narrative with potential destabilizing effects in the region. Abiy argued forcefully that Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea is a strategic necessity, effectively dismissing the sovereignty of Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. His argument revolves around Ethiopia’s landlocked status, which directly impacts its 120 million citizens. To bolster his claim, Abiy evoked the legacy of Ras Alula, a 19th-century Abyssinian warlord from Tigray, who once described the Red Sea as Ethiopia’s “natural boundary.”
This historical narrative of entitlement and expansionism has frequently surfaced in Ethiopian political discourse and was a recurring theme throughout the documentary. However, the broadcast notably omitted a significant historical detail: from the 1200s until the mid-20th century, the Abyssinian Kingdom, comprising what are now the Amhara and Tigray regions, did not have access to the Red Sea. This omission is striking, particularly given the role that British and French colonial powers played in shaping Ethiopia’s modern boundaries and political landscape, leaving a lasting imprint on the region’s politics. The documentary, steeped in the ideologies of Greater Ethiopia mythology and Abyssinian Fundamentalism, sought to reshape and mythologize Ethiopia’s history, emphasizing a narrative of historical entitlement and territorial ambition. However, it failed to acknowledge that historical Abyssinia, the precursor to modern Ethiopia, remained landlocked for centuries.
The Treaty of Addis Ababa in 1896, which recognized Menelik’s Abyssinia following its expansion, was heavily influenced by European colonial interests. Abyssinia’s later incorporation into Italian East Africa in 1936 and its transformation into Ethiopia in 1941 under Haile Selassie were pivotal events shaped by colonial tactics. Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea only materialized in the 1950s following the contentious federation with Eritrea and its eventual absorption in the 1960s, facilitated by Washington and London.
Richard Greenfield, in his article “An Historical Introduction to Refugee Problems in the Horn,” critically examines Ethiopia’s territorial claims over Somali regions, challenging the oversimplified depiction of these areas as merely “lost provinces.” Greenfield underscores the flaws in Ethiopia’s narrative, shedding light on the complex pseudo historical claims that have fueled regional conflicts for generations. Similarly, a New York Times article titled “Ethiopia Presses Claims; Haile Selassie Says Italy Must Never Regain Colonies,” published on September 24, 1945, recounts Emperor Haile Selassie’s address to the United Nations General Assembly. In his speech, Selassie argued for the incorporation of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland into Ethiopia, claiming that these regions were historically part of Ethiopia. This narrative, however, can be seen as part of a broader history of expansionist ambitions by the feudal Abyssinian monarchy, backed first by European powers and later by the U.S., extending beyond their original territory, which was mainly confined to the Amhara and Tigray regions prior to the creation of the modern Ethiopian state after 1890. This expansion was largely driven by European colonial competition, particularly between the French and British, in the Horn of Africa.
Understanding the historical context of British and French colonial influences is crucial to grasp their lasting impact on Ethiopia’s territorial claims and national identity. Contemporary narratives often emphasize Ethiopia’s historical right to the Red Sea while downplaying the significant role that colonial powers played in shaping the nation’s modern boundaries and maritime access. However, Abiy Ahmed’s narrative overlooks the fact that the pre-1890s Abyssinian state, despite European support, remained landlocked until the era of European colonial expansion. The transformation of Abyssinia into a neo-colonial state, reliant on European arms after Menelik II’s reign, is often omitted in discussions about Ethiopia’s Red Sea claims. This selective historical interpretation complicates aligning Ethiopia’s past with its current maritime ambitions, potentially jeopardizing the territorial rights of neighboring countries.
In December 2023, regional dynamics became even more complex with Ethiopia’s involvement in the Somaliland region of northern Somalia. This engagement occurred amidst Somalia’s efforts, mediated by Djibouti, to rekindle dialogue with Somaliland and resolve long-standing disputes. However, these efforts were overshadowed by a surprising provisional agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia. On January 1, 2024, the two entities signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that allowed Ethiopia to lease over 20 kilometers of Somaliland’s Aden coastline near Lughaya for 50 years. Although the terms were not explicitly detailed, they suggested a possible transition to full Ethiopian port ownership and substantial land acquisition in the Awdal region. In return, Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland’s future independence.
This MOU sparked strong reactions from Somalia and its regional allies, who vehemently opposed the agreement. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud expressed this opposition clearly, emphasizing the Red Sea’s strategic importance in global trade and security. He declared, “The Red Sea is a fundamental part of global trade, security, and both present and future opportunities. Somalia is privileged to have a significant geographical stake in it. We will not allow any portion of this territory to be seized by another state, including Ethiopia.” His statement underscored Somalia’s commitment to protecting its territorial integrity and its stake in the geopolitically significant Red Sea corridor.
In response to the escalating diplomatic tensions, Somaliland’s regional leader, Muse Bihi Abdi, publicly addressed the MOU’s terms to clarify its implications. He stated, “The Federal Republic of Ethiopia will be the first African nation to officially recognize the Republic of Somaliland. Additionally, the Republic of Somaliland will lease 20 kilometers of sea to Ethiopia, and Ethiopia will utilize the Berbera Port.” This statement, along with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to downplay the perceived impact of their agreement, highlights the influence of external forces on Abiy’s leadership strategy. Initially, Abiy focused on Eritrea’s coastline for Red Sea access in October 2023, but by January 2024, he had suddenly shifted his attention to Somalia. This abrupt change suggests possible external influences, particularly from the UAE, which operates under the client influence of the UK and Washington in the Horn of Africa.
Abiy’s firm stance has notably strained relationships within the region, drawing opposition from countries like Somalia and Djibouti and prompting Eritrea to call for restraint, viewing his actions as confrontational. This situation underscores the difficulty of distinguishing between mythologized history and actual historical events in contemporary geopolitics. The narratives adopted in these diplomatic exchanges have significant repercussions on regional stability and diplomacy, reflecting the complex interplay of historical perceptions, contemporary politics, and external influences shaping the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa.
Examining Somali, Eritrean, and Ethiopian Reactions to Abiy’s Statements
Efforts by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party to leverage the narrative of Greater Ethiopia mythology to stir nationalistic fervor in Ethiopia have largely failed due to ongoing internal conflicts. The turmoil in Tigray, which remains under the control of the TPLF, along with the federal government’s war against the FANO militia in the Amhara region and clashes in Oromia against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), has significantly hindered the path to national unity. Additionally, factors such as rising inflation, national debt, and the lack of stable job opportunities contribute to the misdirection of Abiy’s policies and the rhetoric around gaining Red Sea access.
The widening gap between Abiy Ahmed’s policies and Amhara nationalist sentiment is particularly evident in his stance on the Red Sea issue. His alignment with Greater Ethiopia mythology, which is highly regarded by the Amhara and somewhat Tigrayan political base, has only deepened the intricate tensions within Ethiopia’s diverse national fabric. This resistance is influenced not only by perceptions of Abiy’s Oromo ethnic background but also by his involvement in the peace process with the TPLF. At the same time, Abiy’s position, expressing support for Abyssinian political mythology, undermines the demonization campaign by hardline Amhara nationalists, who have incorrectly framed Abiy and the Prosperity Party as an extension of Oromummaa (Oromo nationalism), despite his strong adherence to Abyssinian political ideology and the settler colonial identity of Addis Ababa.
The Pretoria Agreement, facilitated by Washington’s envoy Mike Hammer and effective from November 3, 2022, is seen by many Amhara nationalists as a betrayal. More than just a bid for peace in Tigray, it is viewed as a strategic move by Washington to rescue the TPLF and enable its return to Mekelle, despite its defeat by the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF), the FANO militia, and the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). Amhara nationalists’ sense of betrayal is compounded by what they perceive as efforts to sideline and suppress FANO, due to their non-compliance with Washington’s directives, their closeness to the Eritrean state, and their firm opposition to the TPLF, a longstanding asset of Washington.
For Amhara nationalists, FANO is seen as a vital guardian of their regional interests and identity, and any perceived weakening of this group is viewed as a direct affront to the Amhara community. The Pretoria Agreement, perceived as favoring the TPLF, represents a major shift in Ethiopia’s national power dynamics, potentially diminishing the influence and security of the Amhara region. While this agreement aims to bring stability to Tigray, it has inadvertently stoked Amhara fears of marginalization, exacerbating their longstanding concerns about their role in Ethiopia’s ethnically diverse and politically charged environment.
Moreover, Abiy’s unpopularity is not limited to challenges from Amhara nationalists alone, as he also faces significant opposition from Oromo nationalists. Oromo nationalism underscores the complex national identity in Ethiopia, as the Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, have historically sought greater autonomy and recognition within the Ethiopian state. Abiy, himself an Oromo, has not managed to align with the broader aspirations of Oromo nationalism, leading to a disconnect and lack of support from this significant demographic. From the beginning, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s policies have shown an alignment with Greater Ethiopia mythology, often linked to the subjugation and marginalization of various ethnic groups, including his own Oromo people. Before the conflict initiated by the TPLF in the Tigray region against the federal government and Eritrea in November 2020, Abiy’s administration had been conducting a forceful military campaign in the Oromia region since 2018. This conflict in Oromia, significant yet underrecognized, received scant global attention and limited response even from Eritreans, Somalis, and communities within the Amhara and Tigray regions. This global oversight highlights the complex internal dynamics and tensions within Ethiopia, often eclipsed by more prominent conflicts in the northern regions. Meanwhile, the historically subjugated and conquered southern regions, such as Oromia, continue to be marginalized in both national and international narratives. This discrepancy underscores the entrenched complexities and ethnic divisions in Ethiopia, and the challenges in reconciling the diverse and often contradictory interests across its regions.
Despite this background, some Somali and Eritrean commentators have echoed hardline Amhara nationalists’ incorrect view, who criticize Oromo nationalism by intentionally conflating Oromummaa with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party. However, Abiy’s politics stand in stark opposition to the aspirations of Oromo nationalism and align more closely with Abyssinian ideologies. As Professor Asafa Jalata explains, “After Oromos were colonized and until Oromummaa emerged, the self-identity of individuals as being Oromo primarily remained on the personal and group levels since they were denied opportunities to form national institutions. Oromo identity was targeted for destruction, and the colonial administrative regions that were established to suppress the Oromo people and exploit their resources were glorified and institutionalized. As a result, Oromo relational identities have been localized and not strongly connected to the collective identity of Oromummaa.”
Eritrean reactions online have become increasingly vocal and direct in their criticisms of Abiy Ahmed, reflecting a broader dissatisfaction with his leadership in the region.
The Main Role of Washington and London in Ethiopia and Somalia Beyond Hyper-Nationalistic Trappings: The Issue Is Imperialism
One Somali voice critical of the ongoing military occupation is Abukar Arman, though I must express my disagreement with his support of Washington backed TPLF narratives regarding Tigray. Arman contends that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s public proclamations about defending Somalia’s territorial integrity are nothing more than surface-level rhetoric, concealing his failure to take meaningful action against Ethiopian encroachment. Despite the President’s bold declaration that “Nobody can sell a single foot of Somalia’s territory,” his lack of formal complaints or diplomatic efforts in response to Ethiopia’s actions in Somali land suggests a very different reality. As quoted from Abukar Arman in “Geopolitics Of Ethiopia’s Red Sea Seaport Fiasco – OpEd” on January 10, 2024.
London’s Role
The UK, while publicly advocating for restraint and dialogue in the Horn of Africa, has significant economic interests that complicate its role. The British embassy in Somalia stated on X (Twitter), “The UK is concerned by escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa… We reaffirm our full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.” Despite such assurances, the UK’s position as the lead pen-holder on Somalia’s foreign affairs within the UN Security Council raises questions about its impartiality. This concern is heightened by the involvement of British companies like Genel Energy, which was granted oil exploration rights by Somaliland in the Nugaal Valley.
In 2022, when the Somali government declared Genel Energy’s rights to these oil blocks an “illegal claim,” the UK began discreetly supporting Somaliland’s secession to secure its exclusive domain for exploitation. This strategy seemed to be advancing smoothly until the unexpected events in Goojacadde, then Somaliland’s largest military outpost. The people of Las Anod and their allied clans delivered a significant blow to Somaliland’s forces, leading to the formation of SSC-Khatumo—a new political entity that declared independence from Somaliland while affirming its status as part of Somalia’s federal states.
This development posed a direct challenge to the UK’s interests, as the oil-rich territories now fell within the boundaries of SSC-Khatumo. In response, the UK recalibrated its strategy, shifting its support towards a confederation system of governance between Somalia and Somaliland. This new approach, framed as a political solution, allowed the UK to protect its economic stakes in the region while maintaining influence under the guise of supporting a negotiated settlement.
Washington’s Role
Similarly, the US holds substantial influence as Somalia’s pen-holder on maritime issues for the UN Security Council. Like the UK, the US’s actions reveal a clear prioritization of its geopolitical interests over Somalia’s territorial integrity. When news surfaced that Ethiopia was securing a military seaport in the Red Sea—one of the most strategically critical waterways globally—the US response was notably subdued.
State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller expressed the US’s “serious concerns” over escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and called for diplomatic dialogue among stakeholders. Yet, he followed this statement with the standard diplomatic reassurance: “The United States recognizes the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia within its 1960 borders.” While this statement appears supportive, it obscures the reality that pen-holders like the US often manage Somali sovereignty in ways that align with their own interests.
The US has quietly supported agreements between Ethiopia and Somaliland, particularly because the contested areas between Zeila and Lughaye are home to the Heemaal-1 and Heemaal-2 oil blocks, first identified by American oil giant Chevron in the 1980s. The natural seaport of Bulle Ade, previously used by Chevron, also lies within this region, further complicating the US’s stance.
Despite its supposed position of trust, the US has pursued its geopolitical agenda, which at times clashes with Somalia’s strategic interests and territorial integrity. A prime example is the US’s independent negotiations with Somaliland regarding the Berbera military base, a move that directly undermines Somalia’s sovereignty. Navigating the complex and often treacherous landscape of Somali politics requires a nuanced approach, one that avoids the well-trodden paths of deception, corruption, and foreign servitude at the expense of national interests.
Beyond the Surface: The Bigger Picture
Few outspoken Somali commentators were convinced by the diplomatic statements from the US, UK, and international institutions like the United Nations, which appeared to support Somali sovereignty but, in reality, rang hollow. This scenario mirrors how these same entities publicly endorse the One China policy—refusing to officially recognize Taiwan—yet continue to fund and support Taiwan’s diplomatic activities, even backing its presence in Somaliland.
It is crucial to recognize that the real forces driving the UAE’s actions in Somalia are London and Washington, with Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed playing a significant role through his Red Sea propaganda, which heavily leans on Abyssinian Fundamentalism and Greater Ethiopia mythology. This potent propaganda, often laced with hyper-nationalist sentiment, distracts from the strategic moves being orchestrated by these two major powers through their client states, Ethiopia and the UAE. For outside observers, it is essential to avoid falling into the traps of hyper-nationalism or ethnocentric rhetoric—whether it’s Oromos versus Amharas, Somalis versus Oromos, or Eritrea versus Ethiopia versus Somalia versus Somaliland. The larger issue at play is not the intra-African conflicts, but rather the imperialistic strategies being imposed from outside.